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1. an aside
using the word ‘technology’ in the way we know is a recent 
innovation
‘the systematic knowledge of the industrial arts; a discourse or 
treatise on the arts … an explanation of the terms used in the 
arts’(Macdonald 1949)
Technology, as we use the word, is a recent addition to our vocabulary. A dictionary 
published in 1949 advises that technology is 
‘the systematic knowledge of the industrial arts; a discourse or treatise on the 
arts’ or ‘an explanation of the terms used in the arts’1. 
The word has been around for some time. ‘technologie’ appears in Diderot’s 
encylopedia of 1756 but with an unfamiliar usage, and when a book was published 
with the title ‘Elements of technology’ in 1828 a reviewer complained
‘The word technology gives but an imperfect idea of the contents of this 
volume.’2
Only after the Second World War did the term gain currency. Since the term is 
relatively new then we should not expect any long standing theories on the subject.
The Greeks though did have the word technê and it is perhaps worthwhile seeing 
whether what they wrote about has any relevance.
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2.hazards 
politics and technology
Technology engenders ‘mystification, passivity, and fatalism’. This 
may be a sign of its power.
In 1997, Leo Marx wrote a paper entitled ‘Technology: the emergence of a hazardous 
concept’3; he felt, technology engendered ‘mystification, passivity, and fatalism’, 
which contributes to ‘political impotence’.
Socrates would not have recognised Marx’s picture. For Socrates, technê, the distant 
cousin of technology, was, potentially, the ideal political device.
But wait! There may not be clash; rendering the political opposition impotent is a 
political tactic and Marx’s comment may, paradoxically, point to the potency of 
technology as a political weapon.
3.Collective
A technology is a collection of components
‘technology’ conceals laboratories, personnel, funding agencies, 
apparatus, buildings, publications, legends, dreams, theories, 
ambitions, political will and so on that collectively manipulate 
quanta
Marx’s mysticism arises because the word technology cloaks an array of human 
activities. A sentence like ‘A quantum technology is a technology which manipulates 
quantum probability amplitudes directly’4 conceals, in the word ‘technology’, the 
laboratories, personnel, funding agencies, apparatus, buildings, publications, legends, 
dreams, theories, ambitions, political will and so on that collectively manipulate 
quanta.
Perhaps, it is because ‘machines have … been associated with dehumanisation’ that 
we hide the machinery as in the theatre which, Julian Hilton wrote, ‘has rarely faced 
its own technological nature’5.
Technology, then, stands for human endeavours like quantum technology and the 
theatre.
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4.Goals
A technology requires an external goal
For example, ‘biotechnology is a means of gearing the material 
order of living matter … to produce … ‘biovalue’, a surplus value of 
vitality and instrumental knowledge’(Waldby 2000)
Such endeavours need goals and present day conceptions expect technology to 
provide a means to achieve an external goal, for instance, Catherine Waldby writes
‘biotechnology is a means of gearing the material order of living matter … to produce 
… a surplus value of vitality’6
And part of our linguistic confusion about technology is that this, in the Anglo-Saxon 
world, has also become the point of science. As Gerard Milburn wrote,
‘[An] aim of modern science is to reach an understanding of the world … that it may 
be ordered to our purpose.’7
5.Politics
Political action needs a sense of direction and a clear 
passage
the tangled collective to express a sense of direction and it 
requires the displacement of other groups with conflicting 
ambitions
The pursuit of goals for a collective is doubly political. It requires the tangled 
collective to express a sense of direction and needs the displacement of conflicting 
ambitions. Thus the interpretation of the claim that a country is ‘the world’s leading 
… technological … power’8 must be that actions towards meeting the goals of that 
nation are dominant in the world.
And on a smaller scale, the call from the people rooted in the communication industry 
that ‘hopefully … things will start moving …allowing for new technology 
deployment and development’9 must be interpreted as a yearning for their interests to 
predominate.
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6.Self conception
Altering views of authority is a political tactic
Politics can attempt to remove or impose obstacles, or it can 
attempt to change the sense of authority of those who feel 
obstructed, or those who feel uninhibited 
The political effect of technology is to enhance or constrain the capabilities of 
individuals. For instance, an editorial presents surveillance systems as ‘technological 
tools’ that supplement ‘humans by providing an extended perception and reasoning 
capability’10.
But politics can operate on several planes: it can attempt to remove or impose 
obstacles, or it can attempt to change the sense of authority of those who feel 
obstructed, or those who feel uninhibited.
Thus in telecommunications an industry leader claims that growth in the industry 
required ‘changes in the mindset of the users’11. 
Additionally, our assimilation of technologies, changes the way we are organised, the 
way we talk and think and thus alters the way we describe ourselves and our 
relationships. 
These changes dynamically and reflexively present new obstacles and alter political 
targets. Through our technology we both provoke and are provoked by change.
7.Progress
The myth of progress is commonly attached to technology
The demonstration of progress may be an attempt to show how 
technology portrays the ingenuity of humankind
Notable political successes or potential successes of technology are transformed into 
legends of optimism and pessimism by the protagonists.
For instance, there is an echo of the Promethean origin myth in Sir Leon Bagrit’s 
Reith lecture when he said,
‘There is a great technological explosion around us, … freeing … people from 
their traditional bondage to nature’12
And, it seems, that we can expect more since, Gerard Milburn writes, ‘Like the 
horizon, apparent limits to progress of modern technology fade before us as we 
move’13.
Technology it seems is to be created in the image of man for, Sir Leon also noted, ‘the 
direction of modern … technology is towards the creation of … machine-systems 
based on man as a model’14. The goal then seems to be the creation of a self-image. 
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Critics might agree but they might be disturbed by the image that is created, for 
instance, by polluting technologies and technologies of war. The optimists evade these 
moral discomforts by setting their goals as internal to the technological enterprise, as 
an editorial recently claimed
‘Progress in science and technology has led to brilliant successes. We have 
sent men to the moon, built the web, and are on the brink of mapping the 
structure of the genes’15
The external goal is then to provide reassuring demonstrations of the ingenuity of 
humankind rather than improvements in the human condition.
8.Technology
Exploits theories, generates material changes, is a collective 
enterprise and is political
‘Today we are surrounded by technology that owes its existence … 
to the application of quantum mechanical processes. From the 
humble CD player to the marvels of modern optical fibre 
communications … quantum technology is a serious money 
making business’(Davies 1996)
Let sketch things out — using a passage on quantum technology. We expect 
technology to operate within the theoretical framework of science: as the extract says
‘we are surrounded by technology that owes its existence … to the application of 
quantum mechanical processes’
The technology generates material changes, examples given are ‘the humble CD 
player’ and ‘the marvels of modern optical fibre communications’
and the whole is a collective enterprise since, apparently, ‘quantum technology is a 
serious money making business.’ 16
But overall technology is a political enterprise thus devoted to obstructing or 
promoting change.
9.Technê
Translated into art, or skill or science
The Greeks are blamed for using words interchangeably. It is 
conceivable the translators are confused.
The Greek word technê is translated in several ways. Translators blame the Greeks for 
using words interchangeably, but maybe the translators are confused.
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10.Aristotle
Kinds of technê
There are a number of technê which form a hierarchy. Politics is at 
the top.
Aristotle wrote about technê. 
His examples of technê included flute and lyre playing, weaving, building, 
bridlemaking, and navigation. He also mentions the arts of the carpenter, sculptor, 
tanner, geometrician, navigator, doctor, perfumer and chef.
In Aristotle’s scheme there is a hierarchy of technê and, he adds, “the highest … is 
obviously politics”17.
11.Existence
Technê has an end beyond activity
Technology brings good things into existence through skill. The 
skilled person is virtuous.
Aristotle declares every technê is to do with “coming into being”18. It involves 
studying how to bring something, which originates with a producer, into existence. 
The first words in his Ethics are, “Every technê … is thought to aim at some good”19. 
Each technê, Aristotle proposes, creates different goods20, and judgements about the 
goodness in things depend upon the particular trades: for instance we would expect 
the details of justifications about their actions from a carpenter and a geometrician to 
differ.21
Aristotle reckons the skilled person is worthy and their skill is virtuous. Somehow 
some of this virtue rubs off so that every good thing is the product of skill22. However, 
valued things can be produced by accident or imitation so, according to Aristotle, 
particular actions do not identify someone as skilled23. Technê is therefore more than 
action and its goal is to create something good above and beyond a particular activity.
12.Connections
Technê is not supposition or belief
Skill, a mixture of reason and virtue, can be taught and is open to 
rational explanation.
Aristotle, in discussing ethics, contrasts technê with supposition and belief24 and 
presents skill as a mixture of reason and virtue25 which is synonymous with wisdom in 
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technê that Aristotle attributes to “the most exacting practitioners”.26 He presumes 
virtues can either be taught or manifest themselves as habits which the virtuous person 
can properly justify. Since virtue must be justifiable, skills too must be open to 
rational explanation.
13.Deliberation
Technê requires careful deliberation about action
Deliberation is a defining feature of technê and of technology. A 
technological enterprise employs experts deliberate about the 
production of valued products.
Aristotle explains that people deliberate about their technê and because there are 
greater uncertainties, they are more measured than if they were involved in science27. 
This deliberation can be good or bad and cannot simply be the recall of scientific 
knowledge. 
Good deliberation must consist of faultless inferences and contribute to the production 
of a worthy product. Generally, Aristotle writes, this deliberation requires inquiry and 
calculation.
For me, this is the heart of technê and of technology. Rosalind Williams, an erstwhile 
Dean at MIT, suggests that  meetings are “a primary site of technological action 
today” 28, and it is clear that professionals of all kinds in enterprises spend much of 
their time debating the options that will influence the products of their organisation. 
We are also careful in assigning people roles and selecting who can join in 
deliberation, to ensure that the deliberation is of a suitable standard. The engineer, for 
example, is asked to produce considered accounts, reports and justifiable designs — 
internal products for the enterprise which influence production.
14.technê
Aristotle in the Ethics
A technê consists of an activity that produces something of value 
through the actions of skilled people who conceived the product 
and who deliberated about its production
According to Aristotle, then, a technê consists of an activity that produces something 
of value through the actions of skilled people who conceived the product and who 
deliberated about its production. These skilled practitioners can provide justifications 
of their actions that they were taught or that were reinforced through routine. 
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15.technê
Aristotle in the Metaphysics
Generalisation, Teachability, Precision, Explanation
‘we assume that practitioners of technê are wiser than men of mere 
experience … because the former know the cause, whereas the latter 
do not’
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle summarises some major features of technê 
First a technê categorises experience29 to aid prediction. 
Second a technê can be taught.30
Third, a technê should offer precision in judgement. Thus a technê that has established 
and measurable goals is favoured.
Fourthly  a technê offers explanations of its procedures. Aristotle writes
‘we assume that practitioners of technê are wiser than men of mere experience 
… because the former know the cause, whereas the latter do not’31
16.Plato
Promethean legend
Prometheus gives people the technê stolen from the gods. Zeus 
gives humankind a sense of justice and respect.
There is a legend about how Prometheus, the only clever Titan, brought the technê to 
humankind. The story, related by Protagoras, tells how two Titans distributed a pool 
of powers and traits among the creatures formed by the gods from earth and fire. 
Epimetheus asked Prometheus if he could do the job alone, saying that he would let 
Prometheus check the result. Prometheus agreed.
Epimetheus tried to be fair, for example, by giving swiftness to animals that did not 
get strength, but he blundered and ran out of powers before he had dealt with the 
humans. Prometheus, checking the work, discovered the omission.
Humankind was due to emerge from the Earth. To redeem humankind, in haste, 
Prometheus stole the secrets of the arts and crafts from Athena, and the secrets of 
metalworking and fire from the god Hephaestus, and distributed them amongst 
people. This helped humankind survive, but wild animals harried them and when 
people formed groups to protect themselves, they fought among themselves. Zeus was 
alarmed and sent Hermes to imbue humankind with a sense of justice and respect for 
one another.
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17.Aeschylus and Sophocles
Types of technê
Medicine, prophesy, mining, ploughing, government are examples. 
But the political technê is the least developed and not inherited 
from the gods. A new political technê is needed.
In  a play by Aeschylus, Prometheus explains that he taught humankind about 
calendars, astronomy, about the primary skill of number, and about the “mother of 
many arts” — writing. He showed people how to harness animals, exploit horses, 
build ships32 and taught them about medicine, prophesy, mining, and he concludes, 
immodestly, “every technê possessed by man comes from Prometheus”33
In Sophocles’ Antigone the chorus applauds the skills of people that protect them 
from the weather and baffling diseases34, the skills of speech, thought, ploughing, 
taming and trapping animals35. People are praised for bringing order to the city36. 
Their story is of progress but the chorus is uneasy because as Sophocles shows in 
Antigone, people found it difficult to maintain a healthy stability within a city, or a 
family. The creation of humankind did not give them a technê for handling conflicts 
of interest. 
Plato tackles this question.
18.Socrates
Protagoras and Socrates in conversation
Plato through his report of Socrates’ conversations explores 
potential technê of politics — ways of resolving conflict and 
preventing irrational acts.
Protogoras, an early Socratic dialogue, recorded by Plato, opens when a friend is 
surprised that Socrates has not spent time with his youthful lover. Socrates explains 
that he has been to meet the wise Protagoras, and justifies his action by saying, ‘must 
not the wisest appear more beautiful?’37. 
The night before, Hippocrates asked Socrates to go with him the next morning to see 
Protagoras, the famous teacher. Hippocrates wants to learn from Protagoras, but is not 
quite sure what he will learn. Socrates counsels caution because, he declares, teachers 
are like food retailers who say their wares are good for you, but they do not really 
know.38
This opening outlines two problems and Socrates’ solution. The problems are: we 
often have to decide between conflicting options, and our feelings can cause us to act 
rashly. The solution, according to Socrates, is to express all the advantages and 
disadvantages in the same terms then calculate which option outweighs all others. 
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19.Protagoras
Protagoras’ position
Protagoras claims to have a technê of politics that relies on clever 
speech and evades rather than resolves conflict.
The dialogue continues exploring two proposals for a new technê, which is to 
overcome the remaining uncertainties in human lives caused by passions and the 
inconsistencies between our commitments.
Socrates concludes that Protagoras’ art produces clever speakers.39 Protagoras calls it 
‘a technê of politics’ and his recipe for dealing with conflict is primarily one of 
evasion. He provides, he claims, a technê because he is offering an orderly 
understanding. Socrates does not think Protagoras’ art can be taught and challenges it 
as a technê.40 
20.Pythagoras
Plato assumes every technê should include number and 
calculation
Socrates proposes scheme for measuring good and bad which can 
make decision-making a matter of calculation
In the Republic, Plato following Pythagoras writes that every technê must include 
number and calculation41.
Socrates argues that numbers help to decide and compare things. He proposes that 
there are not different kinds of good and bad, and that like weight, good and bad are 
properties that everything has. 
He plans ‘like an expert in weighing, [to] put the pleasures together and the pains 
together… and say which is the greater quantity’42.
Socrates also explains, ‘the technê of measurement’ removes controversial 
appearances, from the equation.
More subtly, it eliminates distinctions that cause us irrationally to cling to treasured 
attachments.
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21.Gorgias
Socrates’ scale extends from pleasure to pain.
In the Gorgias, Socrates wants individual expert judgement, the 
generalisation of experience and unbounded deliberation.
These are not ingredients of a practical politics.
To complete his scheme Socrates requires a satisfactory measure and in the 
Protagoras he adopts a scale of pleasure and pain.
In the Gorgias he elaborates and in the process dismisses certain technê such as 
cooking, music and poetry as worthy pursuits. Where practical politics requires haste, 
his formula requires unbounded deliberation; to gain cooperation decisions require the 
consent of many but Socrates wants the individual judgement of an expert; finally 
Socrates wants to generalise experience where, in contrast, practical politics deals 
with unique circumstances. Socrates solution seems ideal but impractical.
22.Ethics
measurement or consent
Pragmatism demands a settlement on correct standards and 
procedures. Evasion is the likely approach to deep conflict.
‘decisions about right and wrong were engineered into the social 
fabric along with the fire drills and parking regulations’(Ballard 
2001)
In the Protagoras the candidates for a political technê are in dispute. But there is 
no suggestion that the technê given by Prometheus to the proto-humans were 
controversial.
A conceivable explanation is that Prometheus gave the practitioners a way of 
quantifying and measuring everything that mattered to their technê, so their 
judgements involved incontestable calculations. 
A more plausible alternative is that their rituals and habits dodged confrontation, 
and they disregarded highly contentious topics.
What seems likely is that the experts who practise a technê reach a settlement 
about what practices are legitimate, about what standards to apply and who can 
make judgements. The outcome is a tradition of practice, incorporating an 
unquestioned ideology of the craft. As J.G. Ballard writes, ‘decisions about right 
and wrong [are] engineered into the social fabric along with the fire drills and 
parking regulations’43.
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23.Microclimate
A technê has an internal moral calmness
A technê is a practice that upholds largely undisputed standards 
supported by its practitioners.
Thus a technê has an internal moral calmness. This microclimate of ethics is most 
likely based on ideology and not calculation and is therefore messier than Socrates 
would have liked.
A technê is a practice that upholds largely undisputed standards supported by its 
practitioners. A skilled practitioner is then someone, who, according to the 
authorised judges, does a good job. It is unlikely that their standards will generate 
a conflict with wider views on morality, but this may only be because the 
practitioners evade wider moral debate. 
The practitioners do need engage with the wider community to sustain the 
authority to practise but they may do so by baffling their public rather than 
rational argument.
24.Change
Changing ways of life
People and technê are inseparable as new technê emerge so 
people’s self-image is changed.
As the traits given to the animals in the Promethean legend created new forms of 
life, so the development of a technê changes ways of life and hence what it means 
to be human.
Put another way, the formation of a new technê or the spreading of a technê 
changes the self-image of the people involved.
The technê and the people are, cyborg-like, bound together. The changes that 
people and technology undergo, alter what people value and how much they value 
things so that a technê that calms one area of dispute is liable to disturb the 
settlements reached within and amongst other groups of practitioners. And a 
changed and settled technê is equally vulnerable to repercussions from the 
changes it brought about.
Let me give an example of how deep these changes can be.
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25.transformation
the example of electricity
Instead of being analogous to machines, living organisms became 
machines.
Around 1790, Galvani accidentally discovered that static electricity had an effect on 
nerves44. Afterwards the ‘animal spirits’ thought to be in the nerves became ‘animal 
electric fluid’, then ‘animal electricity’ and later simply electricity45.
Soon, biologists were investigating the human nervous system46, physicists were 
advancing electrical theories and engineers were installing the electrical telegraph. 
Around the mid- nineteenth century, it became commonplace to talk about the 
nervous system of the telegraph as an analogue or even to see one as an extension of 
the other. For example, in a popular science book Rev. J.G. Wood wrote ‘the brain 
transmits its message to the limbs by means of the nerves, so does the same brain 
transmit its message … thousands of miles, … utilising … wires’47 
Instead of being analogous to machines, living organisms became machines. 
26.biology
Technological analogies changed biological conceptions
Nowadays, terms like “signal” and “information” and references to 
“communication” familiar to a technologist appear in biologists’ 
books and journals.
Nowadays, terms like “signal” and “information” and references to “communication” 
familiar to a technologist appear in biologists’ books and journals. A journal on 
genetics reports that ‘communication between cells’ is facilitated by ‘signalling 
molecules’ disturbed by ‘crosstalk’48 . DNA has become ‘a program for “computing” 
… sequences of … acids’49 and for some scientists the body is ‘a network of 
informational systems’50.
27.cyborgs
We can see ourselves intimately bound to our technology
The linguistic connection made through analogies between 
biology and electrical systems translates into dreams of material 
connections.
This has encouraged people to see information technology as a means to amplify their 
individual capabilities. Such technology is absorbed into individual human lives until 
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‘the boundary between the “natural” and the “artificial” partner is no longer 
evident.’51 People then become just one kind of device for information processing 52 .
Mechanical substitutes for other human functions have also been proposed, for 
example, ‘Electronic noses’53 .  A ‘retinal implant’ to replace ‘visual-processing 
circuits of the brain’ is under development and ‘cochlear implants …restore hearing’54 
. People also become intimately engaged by embedding their technology in clothing55. 
Well-established technologies are redescribed as extensions of human capabilities. 
Thus Katherine Hayles writes, ‘[w]riting … functions as a technological aid so 
intimately bound up with … thinking …that it acts like a prosthesis’56 .
Technologies offer prosthetic extensions. But human cells also provide materials for 
‘tissue based biosensors’. 
28.Outcome
The uniting of biological and electrical language created the 
cyborg
As the Universe becomes populated with varied combinations of 
body parts and machines ‘we have to radically rethink what we 
mean by ‘body’’(Bell 2001)and self and human.
The trafficking in ways of describing and explaining things has been accompanied by 
a transformation of attitudes towards living things, which become either objects to be 
engineered or potential components of engineered systems. Biological, mechanical 
and electronic systems have lost their distinctiveness and the language of cybernetics 
and communication technology has created the cyborg.
In this melee of language and technology we find we have transformed ‘what we 
mean by ‘body’57  and self and human and technology.
29.Theory
A technology of technology
To be of real value a theory should guide individuals in what they 
should do.
One point of having a theory is to deploy it and presumably to construct a technology. 
Thus we seem to be asking for a technology of technology. If technology is a 
powerful tool, then a technology that allows us to reliably align technology towards 
our own goals would be of value. To be of real value a theory should guide 
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individuals in what they should do. I need therefore to look at things in a microscopic 
scale.
30.Games
Children’s games offer an allegory
Some games are competitive and others cooperative or simply 
pastimes. The point of some games seems to be to disrupt other 
games. There are no written rules or goals.
One of Pieter Bruegel the elder’s paintings painted in 1560, shows children playing 
games in the street, doorways and fields. Artefacts — sticks and hoops, knucklebones, 
barrels — are an integral part of the games. Thirty years earlier Jan van Doesborch of 
Antwerp published a poem that compared humanity to children at play, so maybe the 
picture was painted to depict a contemporary allegory of adults and their ways of life.
Games in the painting are have different numbers of players. In some games, 
everyone has a similar role; in other games there is a clear division of roles. Some 
players are skilled; others are clumsy. Some children drift from one game to another. 
Some games are competitive and others cooperative or simply pastimes. The point of 
some games seems to be to disrupt other games.
It is likely that there are no written rules, and children either know how to play the 
games or learn by watching or imitating others. Books describe the rules for such 
games58, but these rules are merely an account of what the children have been seen to 
do. And where the apparent goal of a game is given, it is just an observation about the 
trend of play. Each game is recognisable because of the combinations of individual 




Wittgenstein introduced language games.
Language, according to Wittgenstein, is a bundle of related techniques. He famously 
likened the similarities between the phenomena of language with the similarities 
between games, and treated the rules merely as observations about the way a game is 
played.
Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto removed distinctions and rendered certain uses 
of language ineffectual and created new possibilities. Haraway’s tactic might be 
turned on the distinctions made between language and technology.
the language of the cybersouls John Monk
If the barriers can be dismantled then there is scope for technology theorists to 
capitalise on the extensive work of philosophers of language.
My interest in doing this is in transforming language games into technology games in 
which the use of an artefact is a move in a technology game, and utility means having 
a place in a game. 
32.Words
Words are artefacts
Words like other artefacts are products and producers
Words, like crafted pots, are bodily products, but words can also be produced by 
speech synthesisers, radios or scoreboards at sports grounds. Words, like machine 
tools, are productive. They affect people, can generate electrical signals or fill pages 
in a book. Words can demonstrate aggression, carelessness and caring—but so can 
objects like cars, litter and birthday cakes. Words are just one of many kinds of 
artefact.
33.Rules
Games have implicit rules
Examples of technology games are Max Weber’s iron cage of 
bureaucracy or Hutchin’s navigational calculations using 
navigational instruments.
Accepting this breach of the distinction between words and other artefacts allows me 
to talk of technology games. Games can be competitive, convivial, disquieting, 
ceremonial, aggressive or sociable. The rules of technology games are manifest in the 
customary restrained practices people engage in, in concert with artefacts — including 
words. Examples of technology games are Max Weber’s iron cage of bureaucracy or 
Hutchin’s navigational calculations using navigational instruments. Warfare, science, 
conferences and commerce are large-scale candidates. Having a meal, taking a ride on 
a tram, growing a flower, creating a corpse are smaller-scale examples.
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34.Artefacts
Artefacts are animated by people
Artefacts, including words, are all simply parts of the world 
modulated by people.
The barriers are flimsy and easily dismantled. Words, like other artefacts, are 
simultaneously products and producers, and artefacts, including words, are all simply 
parts of the world modulated by people.
Karel Capek, the playwright, opened the play that brought us the word "robot", by 
cataloguing a collection of artefacts: "Windows overlook the factory compound, …. 
To the left, … managerial offices … a reclining chair before a vast American desk 
with a lamp, In and Out trays, telephone and paperweight. On the left … hang large 
maps …, a big calendar, a clock …. On the right … are big posters …. On the floor is 
a beautiful Turkish carpet, a low, round table, a sofa, leather armchairs and a 
bookcase containing cash, bottles of wine and spirits …. Beside [the] desk is a table 
with a typewriter"
Alone the artefacts do nothing of significance. It is action and dialogue that animates 
and unites these artefacts. They need actors and an audience.
35.Glue
Humans and non-humans bind each other
the military establishment is ‘… full of terrifying weapons and 
other artifacts [but the] … glue that holds the artifacts together … 
is human activity’(Hutchins 1995)
Similarly, Hutchins explains that the military establishment is "… full of terrifying 
weapons and other artifacts [but the] … glue that holds the artifacts together … is 
human activity"
You could equally well say, in the theatre or the military arena, ‘The hardware is the 
glue that bonds the people together’. 
The distinction between, as Bruno Latour has written, humans and non-humans is 
hazy. 
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36.Cyborgs
Political repercussions
politics is about creating and maintaining distinctions. Removing 
the distinctions between technology, the body and language has 
inevitable political repercussions.
Donna Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto erased the boundary between people and 
machines. Articulated tools and prosthetics, like the telephone, blur bodily 
boundaries, and drugs, medical imaging, texts, films and recorded sound penetrate, 
invade and colonise the body. In commerce and medicine the database, and not flesh, 
is becoming the point of interaction with the individual. 
These technologies give credence to the cyborg, the manifestation of a dissolved 
distinction between people and technology. This is significant because, politics is 
about creating and maintaining distinctions. Removing the distinctions between 
technology, the body and language has inevitable political repercussions. For instance, 
it challenges the precedence given to linguistic expressions in, for example, the 
technology games of academia.
37.Metaphor
Metaphor and technology are vehicles for change.
Metaphor parades its falsehood. Metaphor is an evocative, 
grammatical blunder. Some metaphors catch on and others fail.
Having removed the distinction between words and artefacts, let me exploit a little of 
what philosophers have written about language.
Both technology and metaphor are vehicles for change.
Donald Davidson regarded metaphors as common words tangled in language games in 
which “a sentence used metaphorically” is “usually false”. Metaphor, unlike lying, 
parades its falsehood and encourages us to seek an inexpressible implication. 
Metaphor is, then, an evocative, grammatical blunder. Some metaphors catch on and 
others fail. 
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38.Innovation
Technology is dead innovation.
innovation — the deliberate, apparently improper deployment of an 
artefact that may give us insight
Translated to technology, metaphor is an innovation — the deliberate, apparently 
improper deployment of an artefact that may give us insight. An innovation may be 
useless and discarded, but if it is adopted, it propagates, and becomes commonplace, 
conventional and ultimately part of the backdrop that reveals the novelty in 
subsequent innovations. Technology is dead innovation.
39.Function
There is no such thing as technology
Innovation implies that artefacts do not have fixed functions.
Innovation implies that artefacts do not have fixed functions; paving slabs can become 
missiles; tyres can become toys, so, in a way, there is no universal thing called 
technology. Anything can be part of a technology game; anything can become an 
artefact; any behaviour can be judged a skill; artefacts do not have natural functions. 
But this is not a recipe for anarchy. Skills, artefacts, faith and hence institutions are 
remarkably and stubbornly durable.
40.Obsolescence
Innovation alters the ecology
Artefacts and skills are liable to be transferred to a parallel 
technology game that sustains the myth of progress.
Innovation changes the game
Innovation changes the game, renders some actions, skills and artefacts obsolescent 
and thus alters the ecology. 
Over time, some games become less compelling because the changing technological 
ecology renders contingencies invisible or undermines the legitimate existence of 
artefacts and skills, and the changed repertoire of proper actions consequently alters 
the self-image of the actors.
In the altered circumstances some skills and artefacts will seem quaint or 
anachronistic. Artefacts will become redundant and their accompanying skills 
incongruous. They are then liable to be transferred to a parallel technology game that 
sustains the myth of progress.
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41.Judgement
Existence requires judgement
Judgements are made as to whether an artefact or skill is adequate 
for a game and what or who is eligible for participation.
Institutions form around groups that use the artefacts and judge the skills employed in 
technology games. 
Judgements are made as to whether an artefact or skill is adequate for a game and 
what or who is eligible for participation. 
For an institution, an artefact comes into existence when it is judged to have a place in 
a technology game. Descriptions of these judgements frame criteria; tolerant 
institutions have soft criteria; others are hard. Innovations start out as idiosyncratic 
uses of skills or artefacts, and their existence is relative to institutional criteria. While 
one institution may recognise an innovation, another may not. 
Each institutions’ judgements are constrained by its faith in particular ghosts of 
futures and pasts. For example, engineering companies root their faith in a collage of 
prototypes, experiments, surveys, meetings and documents. Governments have 
sufficient faith to trade in chunks of radio spectra and commerce continuously 
demonstrates faith in monetary artefacts.
Artefacts are thus primarily objects of faith, sustained by utopian myths and histories. 
42.Selfhood
Gender, nationality and professions are constituted from 
technology games
The self is a collection of artefacts attached to a changing variety 
of technology games
As the boundaries between body, technology and language are dismantled, the 
institution of the self becomes a collection of artefacts attached to a changing variety 
of technology games that constitute nations, genders, professions and so on. 
It is often easy to construct or damage institutions such as a personal identity, the past 
or the future using the well-rehearsed skills of language. Computer simulations, 
prototypes, films, photographs and architectural models also offer similar institutional 
elasticity.
The assertion by an erstwhile dean at MIT that, technology ‘simply means 
computers’59, implies a dominance of linguistic and simulation technologies, and 
hence political institutions, including selfhood, of a worryingly flimsy construction.
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43.Conclusion
Technology games constitute the community.
Technology is not a medium. It is integral with being human.
Technology represents an array of overlapping institutions embarking on political 
missions. Within each enterprise we expect to see settlements that establish standards 
of judgement and allocate roles. The enterprise will have, at least the appearance of an 
external goal and much of the activity will be deliberation over how to achieve the 
anticipated ends. The deliberation will be presented as rational and will be formalised 
to a degree, though those outside the enterprise will may question the rationality; in 
part because the institutions and enterprises will overlook criteria, valued practices 
and objects valued by other groups. 
Characteristically, these technological enterprises do not restrict their political devices 
to words but add material goods to their vocabulary.
For an individual, technology is a faith in an amalgam of skills and artefacts that 
coalesce within an array of technology games. This pageant of technology promotes 
tribal practices, orchestrates idiosyncratic behaviour and sustains institutions.
The technology games we play give us a sense of who we are, what contingencies we 
face and how we respond to them. Technology games thus constitute the community.
In all this artefacts are not media, which shape themselves more closely around 
human needs, but are active participants in games which are generating and 
destroying hopes.
Technology is not a medium.
As the Promethean legend illustrates, it is integral with being human.
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